This paper introduces TweetNaCl, a compact reimplementation of the NaCl library, including all 25 of the NaCl functions used by applications. TweetNaCl is published on Twitter and fits into just 100 tweets; the tweets are available from anywhere, any time, in an unsuspicious way. Distribution via other social media, or even printed on a sheet of A4 paper, is also easily possible.
Introduction
OpenSSL is the space shuttle of crypto libraries. It will get you to space, provided you have a team of people to push the ten thousand buttons required to do so. NaCl is more like an elevator-you just press a button and it takes you there. No frills or options.
Live [12] ; in DNSCrypt [21] from OpenDNS; in the secure mobile messaging app Threema [23] ; and in the "new (faster and safer) NTor" protocol [14] , the new default for Tor [24] .
There are several reasons that NaCl has attracted attention. NaCl presents the developer with a high-level API: for example, all of the work necessary for signing a message is integrated into NaCl's crypto_sign function, and all of the work necessary for public-key authenticated encryption is integrated into NaCl's crypto_box function. For each of these functionalities NaCl provides exactly one default combination of cryptographic primitives selected for high security and easy protection against timing attacks. For comparison, OpenSSL [22] provides the implementor with a minefield of options, including many combinations that are broken by timing attacks and many combinations that provide no security at all.
NaCl is also much faster than OpenSSL. For example, on one core of a 2.5GHz Intel Core i5-3210M Ivy Bridge CPU, OpenSSL's RSA-2048 encryption takes 0.13 million cycles but RSA-2048 decryption takes 4.2 million cycles and elliptic-curve encryption/decryption (DH) takes 0.7 million cycles. NaCl's elliptic-curve encryption/decryption takes just 0.18 million cycles. Both NaCl and OpenSSL include optimized assembly-language implementations, but NaCl uses state-of-the-art primitives that inherently allow higher speed than the primitives included in OpenSSL: in this case, the Curve25519 elliptic curve rather than the NIST P-256 elliptic curve or lower-security RSA-2048. This performance gap is not limited to high-end Intel CPUs: see [11] for a performance analysis of the same primitives on the ARM Cortex-A8 CPU core used in the iPad 1 and iPhone 4 three years ago and in the low-cost BeagleBone Black today.
However, NaCl's performance comes at a price. A single NaCl function usually consists of several different implementations, often including multiple assembly-language implementations optimized for different CPUs. NaCl's compilation system is correspondingly complicated. Auditing the NaCl source is a time-consuming job. For example, four implementations of the ed25519 signature system have been publicly available and waiting for integration into NaCl since 2011, but in total they consist of 5521 lines of C code and 16184 lines of qhasm code. Partial audits have revealed a bug in this software (r1 += 0 + carry should be r2 += 0 + carry in amd64-64-24k) that would not be caught by random tests; this illustrates the importance of audits. There has been some progress towards computer verification of formal proofs of correctness of software, but this progress is still far from complete verification of a usable high-security cryptographic library.
TweetNaCl: a small reimplementation of NaCl. This paper introduces TweetNaCl (pronounced "tweet salt"), a reimplementation of all 25 C NaCl functions used by applications. Each TweetNaCl function has exactly the same interface and semantics as the C NaCl function by the same name. (NaCl also includes an alpha-test networking component and support for languages other than C; TweetNaCl does not attempt to imitate these features.)
What distinguishes TweetNaCl from NaCl, and from other cryptographic libraries, is TweetNaCl's conciseness. We have posted TweetNaCl at https://twitter.com/TweetNaCl as a sequence of just 100 tweets. The tweets are also shown in Appendix A of this paper. The tweets, plus 1 byte at the end of each line, occupy a total of 13438 bytes.
What we actually wrote was a slightly less compact 809-line 16621-byte tweetnacl.c. We then wrote a simple Python script, shown in Appendix B, to remove unnecessary spaces and produce the tweet form of TweetNaCl shown in Appendix A. Developers using TweetNaCl are expected to feed the tweet form of TweetNaCl through any standard indentation program, such as the UNIX indent program, to produce something similar to the original tweetnacl.c.
An accompanying 1811-byte Python script, shown in Appendix C, prints a tweetnacl.h that declares all the functions in tweetnacl.c, together with the same set of macros provided by NaCl. NaCl actually splits these declarations and macros into a moderately large collection of .h files such as crypto_box.h, crypto_box_curve25519xsalsa20poly1305.h, etc.; we have a similar Python script that creates the same collection of .h files, but switching to tweetnacl.h is minimal effort for developers.
TweetNaCl is not "obfuscated C": in indented form it is easily human-readable. It does use two macros and five typedefs, for example to abbreviate for (i = 0;i < n;++i) as FOR(i,n) and to abbreviate unsigned char as u8, but we believe that these abbreviations improve readability, and any readers who disagree can easily remove the abbreviations.
TweetNaCl is not merely human-readable; it is human-auditable. TweetNaCl is short enough and simple enough for humans to audit against a mathematical description of the functionality in NaCl such as [2] . TweetNaCl makes it possible to audit the complete cryptographic portion of the trusted code base of a computer system. Of course, compilers also need to be audited (or to produce proofs of correct translations), as do other critical system components.
TweetNaCl is secure and reliable. TweetNaCl is a C library containing the same protections as NaCl against simple timing attacks, cache-timing attacks, etc. It has no branches depending on secret data, and it has no array indices depending on secret data. We do not want developers to be faced with a choice between TweetNaCl's conciseness and NaCl's security.
TweetNaCl is also thread-safe, and has no dynamic memory allocation. TweetNaCl, like C NaCl, stores all temporary variables in limited areas of the stack. There are no hidden failure cases: TweetNaCl reports forgeries in the same way as C NaCl, and is successful in all other cases.
TweetNaCl's functions compute the same outputs as C NaCl: the libraries are compatible. We have verified all TweetNaCl functions against the NaCl test suite.
TweetNaCl is portable and easy to integrate. Another advantage of TweetNaCl's conciseness is that developers can simply add tweetnacl.c and tweetnacl.h into their applications, without worrying about complicated configuration systems or dependencies upon external libraries. TweetNaCl works straightforwardly with a broad range of compilation systems, including cross-compilation systems, and runs on any device that can compile C. We comment that TweetNaCl also provides another form of portability, namely literal portability, while maintaining literal readability: TweetNaCl fits onto a single sheet of paper in a legible font size.
For comparison, the Sodium library from Denis [13] is a "portable, cross-compilable, installable, packageable fork of NaCl, with a compatible API"; current libsodium-0.4.5.tar.gz has 540467 bytes and unpacks into 381 files totaling 2524003 bytes. Many NaCl applications (e.g., DNSCrypt), and 14 NaCl bindings for various languages, are actually using Sodium. TweetNaCl is similar to Sodium in being portable, cross-compilable, installable, and packageable; but TweetNaCl has the added advantage of being so small that it can be trivially incorporated into applications by inclusion rather than by reference. We have placed Tweet-NaCl into the public domain, and we encourage applications to make use of it.
The first version of Sodium was obtained by reducing NaCl to its reference implementations, removing all of the optimized implementations, and simplifying the build system accordingly. We emphasize that this does not produce anything as concise as TweetNaCl. The remaining sections of this paper describe the techniques we used to reduce the complexity of the TweetNaCl code, compared to the NaCl reference implementations.
TweetNaCl is fast enough for typical applications. TweetNaCl's focus on code size means that TweetNaCl cannot provide optimal run-time performance; NaCl's optimized assembly is often an order of magnitude faster. However, TweetNaCl is sufficiently fast for most cryptographic applications. Most applications can tolerate the 4.2 million cycles that OpenSSL uses on an Ivy Bridge CPU for RSA-2048 decryption, for example, so they can certainly tolerate the 2.5 million cycles that TweetNaCl uses for higher-security decryption (Curve25519). Note that, at a typical 2.5GHz CPU speed, this is 1000 decryptions per second per CPU core. One can of course find examples of busy applications that need the higher performance of NaCl, but those examples do not affect the usability of TweetNaCl in typical lower-volume cryptographic applications.
Of course, it would be better for compilers to turn concise source code into optimal object code, so that there is no need for optimized assembly in the first place. We leave this as a challenge for language designers and compiler writers.
TweetNaCl is also small after compilation. TweetNaCl remains reasonably small when compiled, even though this was not its primary goal. For example, when TweetNaCl is compiled with gcc -Os on an Intel CPU, it takes only 12745 bytes. Small compiled code has several benefits: perhaps most importantly, it avoids instruction-cache misses, both for its own startup and for other code that would otherwise have been kicked out of cache. Note that typical cryptographic benchmarks ignore these costs.
For some C compilers, putting all of TweetNaCl into a single .c file prevents separate linking: the final binary will include all TweetNaCl functions even if not all of those functions are used. Any developers who care about the penalty here could comment out the unused code, but TweetNaCl is so small that this penalty is negligible in the first place.
On some platforms, code is limited in total size, not just in the amount that can be cached. This was the motivation for Hutter and Schwabe to reimplement NaCl to fit into the limited flash storage and RAM available on AVR microcontrollers [18] . Their low-area implementation consists of several thousand lines written in assembly and compiles to 17366 bytes; they also have faster implementations using somewhat more area. TweetNaCl compiles to somewhat more code, 29608 bytes on the same platform, but is much easier to read and to verify, especially since the verification work for TweetNaCl is shared across platforms.
TweetNaCl is a full library, not just isolated functions. In June 2013, Green [16] announced a new contest to "identify useful cryptographic algorithms that can be formally described in one Tweet." TweetNaCl is inspired by, but not a submission to, this contest. Unlike the submissions in that Twitter thread, later submissions using #C1T on Twitter, or TweetCipher [1] (authenticated encryption in 6 tweets, but with an experimental cryptosystem cobbled together for the sole purpose of being short), TweetNaCl provides exactly NaCl's highlevel high-security cryptographic operations. TweetNaCl includes all necessary conversions to and from wire format, modular arithmetic from scratch, etc., using nothing but the C language.
TweetNaCl provides extremely high source-code availability. In 1995, at the height of the crypto wars, the United States government regarded cryptographic software as arms and subjected it to severe export control. In response, Zimmermann published the PGP software as a printed book [27] . The export-control laws did not cover printed material, so the book crypto_box = crypto_box_curve25519xsalsa20poly1305 crypto_box_open crypto_box_keypair crypto_box_beforenm crypto_box_afternm crypto_box_open_afternm crypto_core_salsa20 crypto_core_hsalsa20 crypto_hashblocks = crypto_hashblocks_sha512 crypto_hash = crypto_hash_sha512 crypto_onetimeauth = crypto_onetimeauth_poly1305 crypto_onetimeauth_verify crypto_scalarmult = crypto_scalarmult_curve25519 crypto_scalarmult_base crypto_secretbox = crypto_secretbox_xsalsa20poly1305 crypto_secretbox_open crypto_sign = crypto_sign_ed25519 crypto_sign_open crypto_sign_keypair crypto_stream = crypto_stream_xsalsa20 crypto_stream_xor crypto_stream_salsa20 crypto_stream_salsa20_xor crypto_verify_16 crypto_verify_32 could be shipped abroad. Producing usable PGP software from the printed copies (see [26] ) required hours of volunteer work to OCR and proofread over 6000 pages of code.
TweetNaCl fits onto just 1 page. This conciseness opens up many new possibilities for software distribution, ensuring the permanent availability of TweetNaCl to users worldwide, even users living under regimes that have decided to censor our 100 tweets. Of course, PGP is a full-fledged cryptographic application rather than just a cryptographic library, but we expect TweetNaCl to enable a broad spectrum of small high-security cryptographic applications.
Functions supported by TweetNaCl. Simple NaCl applications need only six high-level NaCl functions: crypto_box for public-key authenticated encryption; crypto_box_open for verification and decryption; crypto_box_keypair to create a public key in the first place; and similarly crypto_sign, crypto_sign_open, crypto_sign_keypair.
A minimalist implementation of the NaCl API would provide just these six functions. TweetNaCl is more ambitious, supporting all 25 of the NaCl functions listed in Table 1 , which as mentioned earlier are all of the C NaCl functions used by applications. This list includes all of NaCl's "default" primitives except for crypto_auth_hmacsha512256, which was included in NaCl only for compatibility with standards and is superseded by crypto_onetimeauth.
As mentioned earlier, the Ed25519 signature system has not yet been integrated into NaCl, since the Ed25519 software has not yet been fully audited; NaCl currently provides an older signature system. However, NaCl has announced that it will transition to Ed25519, so TweetNaCl provides Ed25519.
In surveying NaCl applications we have found two main reasons that applications go beyond the minimal list of six functions. First, many NaCl applications split (e.g.) crypto_box into crypto_box_beforenm and crypto_box_afternm to improve speed. Second, some NaCl applications are experimenting with variations of NaCl's high-level operations but continue to use lower-level NaCl functions such as crypto_secretbox and crypto_hash.
It is important for all of these applications to continue to work with TweetNaCl. The challenge here is the code size required to provide many functions. Even a single very simple function such as int crypto_box_beforenm(u8 *k,const u8 *y,const u8 *x) { u8 s[32]; crypto_scalarmult(s,x,y); return crypto_core_hsalsa20(k,z,s,sigma); } costs us approximately 1 tweet. We could use shorter function names internally, but we would then need further wrappers to provide all the external function names listed in Table 1 . We have many such functions, and a limited tweet budget, limiting the space available for actual cryptographic computations.
2 Salsa20, HSalsa20, and XSalsa20 NaCl encrypts messages by xor'ing them with the output of Bernstein's Salsa20 [5] stream cipher. The Salsa20 stream cipher generates 64-byte output blocks using the Salsa20 "core function" in counter mode. The main loop in NaCl's reference implementation of the Salsa20 core function, crypto_core/salsa20/ref/core.c, transforms 16 32-bit words x0, x1, . . . , x15 as follows, where ROUNDS is 20: We emphasize two levels of Salsa20 symmetry that appear in the Salsa20 specification and that are expressed explicitly in this TweetNaCl loop. First, the 20 rounds in Salsa20 alternate between "column rounds" and "row rounds", with column rounds operating on columns of
x [4] x [5] x [6] x [7] x [8] x [9] x [10] x [11] x [12] x [13] x [14] x [15]     and row rounds operating in exactly the same way on rows of the matrix. TweetNaCl computes a row round as a transposition of the matrix followed by a column round followed by another transposition; i.e., the 20 rounds consist of 20 iterations of "compute a column round and transpose the output". The transposed result of each round is built in a separate array w to avoid overwriting the round input; it is then copied from w back to x. One can easily see that the indices 4*j+(j+m)%4 for w are the transposes of the indices (5*j+4*m)%16 for x. Second, the column round operates on the column down from x[0], operates in the same way on the column down from x [5] (wrapping around to x [1] ), operates in the same way on the column down from x [10] , and operates in the same way on the column down from x [15] . TweetNaCl has j loop over the 4 columns; the x index (5*j+4*m)%16 is m columns down from the starting point in column j.
For comparison, the indices in the second half of the NaCl loop shown above are the transposes of the indices in the first half, and the indices in the first half have these symmetries across columns. Verifying these 96 indices is of course feasible but takes considerably more time than verifying the corresponding segment of TweetNaCl code-and this is just the first of many ways in which NaCl's reference implementations consume more code than TweetNaCl.
Stream generation and stream encryption. NaCl actually has two ways to use Salsa20: crypto_stream_salsa20 produces any desired number of bytes of the Salsa20 output stream; crypto_stream_salsa20_xor produces a ciphertext from a plaintext. Both of these functions are wrappers around crypto_core_salsa20; both functions handle initialization and updates of the block counter, and output lengths that are not necessarily multiples of 64. The difference is that the second function xors each block with a plaintext block, moving along the plaintext accordingly.
In TweetNaCl, crypto_stream_salsa20 simply calls crypto_stream_salsa20_xor with a null pointer for the plaintext. This eliminates essentially all the duplication of code between these two functions, at the expense of three small tweaks to crypto_stream_salsa20_xor, such as replacing
to treat a null pointer m as if it were a pointer to an all-0 block. XSalsa20 and HSalsa20. NaCl's crypto_stream actually uses Bernstein's XSalsa20 stream cipher (see [6] ) rather than the Salsa20 stream cipher. The difference is that XSalsa20 supports 32 bytes of nonce/counter input while Salsa20 supports only 16 bytes of nonce/counter input. XSalsa20 uses the original 32-byte key and the first 16 bytes of the nonce to generate an intermediate 32-byte key, and then uses Salsa20 with the intermediate key and the remaining 16 bytes of nonce/counter to generate each output block.
The intermediate key generation, called "HSalsa20", is similar to Salsa20 but slightly more efficient, and has a separate implementation in NaCl. For our purposes this is a problem: it means almost doubling the code size.
TweetNaCl does better by viewing HSalsa20 as (1) generating a 64-byte Salsa20 output block, (2) extracting 32 bytes from particular output positions, and then (3) transforming those 32 bytes in a public invertible way. The transformation is much more concise than a separate HSalsa20 implementation, allowing TweetNaCl to implement both crypto_core_salsa20 and crypto_core_hsalsa20 as wrappers around a unified core function.
We do not claim novelty for this view of HSalsa20: the same structure is exactly what allowed the proof in [6] that the security of Salsa20 implies the security of HSalsa20 and XSalsa20. What is new is the use of this structure to simplify a unified Salsa20/HSalsa20 implementation.
Poly1305
Secret-key authentication in NaCl uses Bernstein's Poly1305 [3] authenticator. The Poly1305 code in the NaCl reference implementation is already quite concise. For elements of F 2 130 −5 it uses a radix-2 8 representation; we use the same representation for TweetNaCl.
The NaCl reference implementation uses a mulmod function for multiplication in F 2 130 −5 , a squeeze function to perform two carry chains after multiplication and a freeze function to produce a unique representation of an element of F 2 130 −5 . Each of these functions is called only once in the Poly1305 main loop; we inline those functions to remove code for the function header and the call. The reference implementation also uses an add function which is called once in the main loop, once during finalization and once inside the freeze function. We keep the function, but rename it to add1305 to avoid confusion with the add function used (as described in Section 5) for elliptic-curve addition.
We furthermore shorten the code of modular multiplication. NaCl's reference implementation performs multiplication of h by r with the result in hr as follows: 
SHA-512
The default hash function in NaCl and the hash function used within the Ed25519 signature scheme (see Section 5) is SHA-512 [25] . The SHA-512 code in the NaCl reference implementation consists of two main portions of code:
-The function crypto hash, which performs initialization of the hash value with the IV and computation of padding; and the crypto hashblocks function which performs hashing of full blocks.
Padding. Outside of crypto_hashblocks, the most complex part of crypto_hash is the message padding. The reference padding code, with TweetNaCl's choices of variable names substituted for the original choices, is as follows:
for (i = 0;i < n;++i) This segment handles two possibilities for processing the final partial block of SHA-512 input: if the block has fewer than 112 bytes then it is padded to 128 bytes; otherwise it is padded to 256 bytes. The padding ends with a 9-byte big-endian encoding of the number of message bits.
TweetNaCl simplifies this code in three ways. First, it eliminates the two separate lines of zero-padding x in favor of initializing the whole array to 0. Second, elsewhere in TweetNaCl there is a ts64 function (used at the end of the SHA-512 compression function) that stores 64 bits in big-endian form; TweetNaCl reuses this function inside the padding. Third, TweetNaCl merges the two branches, reusing n (which has no later use) for the number of bytes in the padded block. The final padding code is much more concise than the original: Hashing blocks. SHA-512 performs 80 rounds of computation per block. The NaCl reference implementation has 80 lines for these 80 rounds. Each round is just one invocation of an F macro (interruped by invocations of an EXPAND macro after every 16 rounds), but this still results in a significant amount of code. TweetNaCl instead uses a loop over the 80 rounds. With such a "rolled" loop there is only one invocation of each of the macros, so TweetNaCl inlines those.
In NaCl the 16 64-bit message words are loaded into variables w0, w1, . . . , w15; the internal temporary state is kept in variables a, b, . . . , h. TweetNaCl uses arrays u64 w [16] and u64 a [8] instead. This allows us to also roll all initialization and copy loops. The final code for processing one 128-byte block is the following: Obviously there is still some complexity in this code, but this directly reflects the inherent complexity of the SHA-512 function; the SHA-512 specification [25] is easily verified to match TweetNaCl's implementation. The functions Sigma1, Ch, Sigma0, Maj, sigma0, and sigma1 are one-line implementations of the functions Σ 1 , Ch, Σ 0 , M aj, σ 0 , and σ 1 from the SHA-512 specification.
Curve25519 and Ed25519
Asymmetric cryptography in NaCl uses Bernstein's Curve25519 elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange [4] and will use the Ed25519 elliptic-curve signature scheme from Bernstein, Duif, Lange, Schwabe, and Yang [7, 8] . This section explains the techniques we use for our compact implementation of these two schemes.
Arithmetic in F 2 255 −19 . Both Curve25519 and Ed25519 require arithmetic in the field F 2 255 −19 . We represent an element of this finite field as an array of 16 signed 64-bit integers (datatype signed long long) in radix 2 16 : typedef i64 gf [16] ;
Additions and subtractions do not have to worry about carries or modular reduction; they simply turn into a loop that performs 16 coefficient additions or subtractions.
Multiplication performs simple "operand scanning" schoolbook multiplication in two nested loops. We then reduce modulo 2 256 − 38:
The 16 result coefficients in o are too large to be used as input to another multiplication. We use two calls to a car25519 carry function to solve this problem. This carry function modifies the result o in place as follows:
Aside from carrying from one limb to the next, the function also adds 2 16 to each limb and subtracts 1 from the next highest limb before performing the carry. This ensures that repeated application of the function brings all limbs into the interval [0, 2 16 − 1]. Without this addition, repeated application of the carry chain would bring all limbs into the interval [−2 16 −1, 2 16 −1]. We use this additional functionality to "freeze" field elements to a unique representation at the very end of the Curve25519 or Ed25519 computations.
We reuse the multiplication for squarings, but make squarings explicit by spending a few bytes of source code for a separate function that simply calls multiplication. This makes it easy during code audit to compare the code to elliptic-curve addition formulas, for example from the Explicit Formulas Database [9] . To match the notation of [9] we use the names M and S for functions that multiply and square in the field F 2 255 −19 ; we also use A for addition and Z for subtraction.
Inversion uses Fermat's little theorem and is implemented through exponentation with 2 255 − 21. We use a simple square-and-multiply algorithm and avoid storing the exponent by making use of its special shape: it has all bits set but the bits at position 4 and position 2. We perform the square-and-multiply loop for inversion as follows:
The square-root computation for elliptic-curve point decompression in Ed25519 uses exponentiation by 2 252 − 3. See [7, Section 5] . Observe that this exponent has all bits set but the bit at position 1; we use the same approach as for inversion.
Curve arithmetic. The typical Curve25519 implementation computes a Montgomery ladder [19] on the Montgomery curve M : y 2 = x 3 + 486662x 2 + x. The Ed25519 signature scheme performs arithmetic on the birationally equivalent twisted Edwards curve E : −x 2 + y 2 = 1 − 121665 121666 x 2 y 2 . More specifically, Ed25519 key generation and signing perform a fixed-basepoint scalar multiplication; verification performs a double-scalar multiplication.
In principle we could use the same scalar-multiplication code for both Curve25519 and Ed25519. This would require conversion of points on M to points on E and back. If we used the x-coordinate-based differential addition ladder of Curve25519 also for Ed25519, we would additionally need code to recover the y-coordinate as described by Okeya and Sakurai in [20] . Conversion code is not substantially shorter than the code required for the Curve25519 Montgomery ladder, so we decided to not use the same code for scalar multiplication in Curve25519 and Ed25519.
Curve25519 uses the same Montgomery ladder as the reference implementation, except that we do not use a dedicated function for multiplication by the constant 121666. For Ed25519 we decided to use only one scalar-multiplication routine that can be used in key generation, signing, and verification. We represent points on E in extended coordinates as described in [17] and implement the complete addition law in an add function. We use this function for both addition and doubling of points. The scalar multiplication then performs a ladder of 256 steps; each step performs an addition and a doubling: Arithmetic modulo the group order. Signing requires reduction of a 512-bit integer modulo the order of the Curve25519 group, a prime p = 2 252 + δ where δ ≈ 2 124.38 . We store this integer as a sequence of limbs in radix 2 8 . We eliminate the top limb of the integer, say 2 504 b, by subtracting 2 504 b and also subtracting 2 252 δb; we then perform a partial carry so that 20 consecutive limbs are each between −2 7 and 2 7 . We repeat this procedure to eliminate subsequent limbs from the top. This is considerably more concise than typical reduction methods: We similarly eliminate any remaining multiple of 2 252 , leaving an integer between −1.1 · 2 251 and 1.1 · 2 251 . We then multiply the final carry bit by p and add, obtaining an integer between 0 and p − 1, and carry in the traditional way so that each limb is between 0 and 255.
A The 100 tweets #include "tweetnacl.h" #define FOR(i,n) for (i = 0;i < n;++i) #define sv static void typedef unsigned char u8;typedef unsigned long u32;typedef unsigned long long u64;typedef long long i64;typedef i64 gf [16] ;extern void randombytes(u8*,u64);static const u8 _0 [16] ,_9[32]={9};static const gf gf0,gf1={1},_121665={0xDB41,1}, D={0x78a3,0x1359,0x4dca,0x75eb,0xd8ab,  0x4141,0x0a4d,0x0070,0xe898,0x7779,0x4079,0x8cc7,0xfe73,0x2b6f,0x6cee,0x5203},D2={0xf159,0x26b2,0x9b94,0xebd6,0xb156,0x8283,0x149a,0x00e0,  0xd130,0xeef3,0x80f2,0x198e,0xfce7,0x56df,0xd9dc,0x2406},X={0xd51a,0x8f25,0x2d60,0xc956,0xa7b2,0x9525,0xc760,0x692c,0xdc5c,0xfdd6,0xe231,  0xc0a4,0x53fe,0xcd6e,0x36d3,0x2169},Y={0x6658,0x6666,0x6666,0x6666,0x6666,0x6666,0x6666,0x6666,0x6666,0x6666,0x6666,0x6666,0x6666,0x6666,  0x6666,0x6666},I={0xa0b0,0x4a0e,0x1b27,0xc4ee,0xe478,0xad2f,0x1806,0x2f43,0xd7a7,0x3dfb,0x0099,0x2b4d,0xdf0b ,0x4fc1,0x2480,0x2b83};static u32 L32(u32 x,int c){return(x<<c)|(x>>(32-c));}static u32 ld32(const u8*x){u32 u=x [3] ;u=(u<<8)|x [2] ;u=(u<<8)|x [1] ; [17] ={5,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,252};int crypto_onetimeauth(u8*out,const u8*m,u64 n,const u8*k){u32 s,i,j,u,x [ 17] ,r [17] ,h [17] ,c [17] ,g [17] ; R (x,61)^(x>>6);}static const u64 K[80]={0x428a2f98d728ae22ULL,0x7137449123ef65cdULL,0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2fULL,0xe9b5dba58189dbbcULL, 0x3956c25bf348b538ULL,0x59f111f1b605d019ULL,0x923f82a4af194f9bULL,0xab1c5ed5da6d8118ULL,0xd807aa98a3030242ULL,0x12835b0145706fbeULL, 0x243185be4ee4b28cULL,0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2ULL,0x72be5d74f27b896fULL,0x80deb1fe3b1696b1ULL,0x9bdc06a725c71235ULL,0xc19bf174cf692694ULL, 0xe49b69c19ef14ad2ULL,0xefbe4786384f25e3ULL,0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5ULL,0x240ca1cc77ac9c65ULL,0x2de92c6f592b0275ULL,0x4a7484aa6ea6e483ULL, 0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4ULL,0x76f988da831153b5ULL,0x983e5152ee66dfabULL,0xa831c66d2db43210ULL,0xb00327c898fb213fULL,0xbf597fc7beef0ee4ULL, 0xc6e00bf33da88fc2ULL,0xd5a79147930aa725ULL,0x06ca6351e003826fULL,0x142929670a0e6e70ULL,0x27b70a8546d22ffcULL,0x2e1b21385c26c926ULL, 0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aedULL,0x53380d139d95b3dfULL,0x650a73548baf63deULL,0x766a0abb3c77b2a8ULL,0x81c2c92e47edaee6ULL,0x92722c851482353bULL, 0xa2bfe8a14cf10364ULL,0xa81a664bbc423001ULL,0xc24b8b70d0f89791ULL,0xc76c51a30654be30ULL,0xd192e819d6ef5218ULL,0xd69906245565a910ULL, 0xf40e35855771202aULL,0x106aa07032bbd1b8ULL,0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8ULL,0x1e376c085141ab53ULL,0x2748774cdf8eeb99ULL,0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8ULL, 0x391c0cb3c5c95a63ULL,0x4ed8aa4ae3418acbULL,0x5b9cca4f7763e373ULL,0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3ULL,0x748f82ee5defb2fcULL,0x78a5636f43172f60ULL, 0x84c87814a1f0ab72ULL,0x8cc702081a6439ecULL,0x90befffa23631e28ULL,0xa4506cebde82bde9ULL,0xbef9a3f7b2c67915ULL,0xc67178f2e372532bULL, 0xca273eceea26619cULL,0xd186b8c721c0c207ULL,0xeada7dd6cde0eb1eULL,0xf57d4f7fee6ed178ULL,0x06f067aa72176fbaULL,0x0a637dc5a2c898a6ULL, 0x113f9804bef90daeULL,0x1b710b35131c471bULL,0x28db77f523047d84ULL,0x32caab7b40c72493ULL,0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebcULL,0x431d67c49c100d4cULL, 0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6ULL,0x597f299cfc657e2aULL,0x5fcb6fab3ad6faecULL,0x6c44198c4a475817ULL};int crypto_hashblocks(u8*x,const u8*m,u64 n){u64 z [ 8] );return n;}static const u8 iv[64]={0x6a,0x09,0xe6,0x67,0xf3,0xbc,0xc9,0x08,0xbb,0x67,0xae,0x85,0x84,0xca,0xa7,0x3b,0x3c,0x6e,0xf3,0x72,0xfe,0x94,0xf8,0x2b, 0xa5,0x4f,0xf5,0x3a,0x5f,0x1d,0x36,0xf1,0x51,0x0e,0x52,0x7f,0xad,0xe6,0x82,0xd1,0x9b,0x05,0x68,0x8c,0x2b,0x3e,0x6c,0x1f,0x1f,0x83,0xd9,0xab, 0xfb,0x41,0xbd,0x6b,0x5b,0xe0,0xcd,0x19,0x13,0x7e,0x21,0x79};int crypto_hash(u8*out,const u8*m,u64 n) ={0xed,0xd3,0xf5,0x5c,0x1a,0x63,0x12,0x58,0xd6, 0x9c,0xf7,0xa2,0xde,0xf9,0xde,0x14,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0x10};sv modL(u8*r,i64 ;modL(sm+32,x);return 0;}static int unpackneg(gf r [4] ,const u8 p[32]){gf t,chk,num,den,den2 ,den4,den6;set25519(r [2] ,gf1);unpack25519(r [1] ,p);S(num,r [1] );M(den,num,D);Z(num,num,r [2] );A(den,r [2] ,den);S(den2,den);S(den4,den2);M(den6, den4,den2);M(t,den6,num);M(t,t,den);pow2523(t,t);M(t,t,num);M(t,t,den);M(t,t,den);M(r[0],t,den);S(chk,r 
